Rising Debt and Higher Net Worth portend a Housing Bubble in Canada

Posted by PITHOCRATES - December 15th, 2013

Week in Review

The Canadians like to think of themselves as kinder and gentler than their neighbors south of the border.  For they have a generous welfare state.  Including single-payer health care.  Unlike those Americans who put profits before people.  But it comes at a price.  High taxes.  And they do pay a lot.  But they get a lot.  Those high taxes, though, lower take-home pay.  Giving Canadians less disposable income than their neighbors south of the border.  Which means they have to borrow more to make up for that smaller disposable income (see Personal debt ratio hits record high of 163.7% posted 12/13/2013 on CBC News).

Statistics Canada reported Friday that the level of household credit market debt to disposable income increased to 163.7 per cent in the third quarter from 163.1 per cent in the second quarter.

That means Canadians owe nearly $1.64 for every $1 in disposable income they earn in a year.

Policymakers are fixated on the debt ratio in part because it was at above 160 per cent that households in the United States and Britain ran into trouble about five years ago, contributing to defaults and the financial crisis that triggered the 2008-09 recession…

Indeed, while they are borrowing more, Canadians are also worth more as their assets increase by a similar amount. The national net worth increased to $7.5 trillion in the third quarter, up 2.1 per cent from the previous quarter.

On a per capita basis, that works out to $212,700 for every Canadian. The previous quarter, that figure was $208,300.

Rising net worth and rising debt?  Gee, what could that mean?  Well, most people’s wealth is determined by the price of their home.  As the value of their homes rise so does their net worth.  That is, their net worth rises as the price of their home (if they were to sell) rises.  And as their home price rises so do other home prices.  Which increases mortgage amounts.  As people borrow more to buy these more expensive homes.  And the lower the interest rates the more they will borrow and the bigger the house they will buy.  And this creates a what?  That’s right.  A housing bubble (see Is There a Canadian Housing Bubble? by Carrie Rossenfeld posted 11/13/2013 on GlobeSt.com).

GlobeSt.com: What factors lead experts to think there may be a Canadian housing bubble?

Muoio: For us, the biggest sign there is a housing bubble is how far prices have appreciated without a corresponding rise in income. This means housing affordability is falling rapidly and will eventually reach a tipping point. Additionally, if lenders are underwriting against an expectation of rising prices, this could result in loosening standards and too much leverage in the system.

GlobeSt.com: How similar are these factors to what happened to the US housing market before the recession?

C.M.: Very similar. US home prices kept appreciating while incomes saw only modest growth in the final years before the bubble burst. This led to a situation where eventually housing just became entirely unaffordable and the market’s liquidity completely dried up. With people over-levered due to the loose lending standards (which were enabled by the expectation of rising prices), this led to a massive unwind and foreclosure mess we are still working through. Additionally, Canada, just like us at the time, is building an extreme amount of homes that could lead to oversupply issues.

A rising debt level and higher net worth probably is more bad news than good.  For it is likely a sign of a housing bubble.  Just like these very things were a sign of a housing bubble in the U.S. just before the subprime mortgage crisis.  Or is it a sign that Canadians are just taxed too much leaving them with less disposable income?  Forcing them to borrow more as they cannot save enough for a sizeable down payment to reduce the amount they have to finance?   Or is it both?

It appears the Canadians can’t learn from the Americans.  And when the Canadian bubble bursts the Americans won’t learn anything from the Canadians.  For governments today want to keep interest rates low to encourage home ownership.  Which they do.  Taking us from bubble to bubble.  And from recession to recession.



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Trend Analysis GM and Toyota 2005—2008

Posted by PITHOCRATES - January 29th, 2013

History 101

GM’s Problems were caused by Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his Ceiling on Wages

The GM bailout is still controversial.  It was part of the 2012 campaign.  It was why we should reelect President Obama.  Because Osama bin Laden was dead.  And General Motors was alive.  But the bailout didn’t fix what was wrong with GM.  Why it went bankrupt in the first place.  The prevailing market price for cars was below their costs.  And what was driving their costs so high?  It was labor.  It was the UAW wage and benefit package that made it impossible for GM to sell a car profitably.

GM’s problems go back to Franklin Delano Roosevelt.  The country was suffering in the Great Depression with double-digit unemployment.  He wanted to get businesses to hire people.  To reduce unemployment.  And pull us out of the Great Depression.  So how do you get businesses to hire more people?  Hmmm, he thought.  Pay people less so businesses have more money to hire more people.  It was brilliant.  So FDR imposed a ceiling on wages.  Why did FDR do this?  Because he was from a rich family who didn’t understand business or basic economics.

Of course there was one major drawback to this.  How do you get the best talent to work for you if you can’t pay top dollar?  Normally the best talent can go to whoever pays the most.  But if everyone pays the same by law you might as well work at the place closest to your house.  Or across from the best bars.  No, if a business wanted the best workers they had to figure out how to get them to drive across town in rush hour traffic and sit in that traffic on the way home.  A real pain in the you-know-what.  So how to get workers to do that if you can’t pay them more?  You give them benefits.

Toyota doesn’t have the Legacy Costs that Bankrupted an Uncompetitive GM

And this was, is, the root of GM’s problems.  Those generous pension and health care benefits.  Things we once took care of ourselves.  Before our employers started providing these.  And the UAW really put the screws to GM.  Getting great pay, benefits and workplace rules.  For both active workers.  And retirees.  Even laid-off workers.  Such as the job bank.  Where GM paid workers who had no work to do.  It’s benefits like this that have bankrupted GM.  Especially the pensions and health care costs for retired workers.  Who outnumbered active workers.  Those people actually assembling the cars they sell.

It’s these legacy costs that have made GM uncompetitive.  Toyota, for example, didn’t suffer the FDR problem.  So their costs for retired workers don’t exceed their costs for active workers.  In fact let’s compare GM and Toyota for the four years just before GM’s government bailout (2005-2008).  We pulled financial numbers from their annual reports (see GM 2005 & 2006, GM 2007 & 2008, Toyota 2005 & 2006 and Toyota 2007 & 2008).  We’ve used some standard ratios and plotted some resulting trends.  Note that this is a crude analysis that provides a general overview of the information in their annual reports.  A proper analysis is far more involved and you should not construe that the following is an appropriate way to analyze financial statements.  We believe these results show general trends.  But we offer no investment advice or endorsements.

GM Toyota Current Ratio

We get the current ration by dividing current assets by current liabilities.  These are the assets/liabilities that will become cash or will have to be paid with cash within 12 months.  If this ratio is 1 it means current assets equals current liabilities.  Meaning that a business will have just enough cash to meet their cash needs in the next 12 months.  If the number is greater than 1 a business will have even a little extra cash.  If the number is less than 1 a business is in trouble.  As they won’t have the cash to meet their cash needs in the next 12 months.  Unless they borrow cash.  Toyota’s current ratio fell slightly during these 4 years but always remained above 1.  Falling as low as 1.01.  Whereas GM’s current ratio was never above 1 during these 4 years.  And only got worse after 2006.  Showing GM’s financial crash in 2008.

The GM Bailout did not address the Cause of their Bankruptcy—UAW Pensions and Health Care Benefits

There are two basic ways to finance a business.  With debt.  And equity.  Equity comes from outside investors (when a business issues new stock).  Or from profitable business operations.  Which typically accounts for the majority of equity.  Profitable business operations are the whole point of running a business.  And it’s what raises stock prices.  To see which is providing the financing of a business (debt or equity) we calculate the debt ratio.  We do this by dividing total liabilities by total assets.  If this number equals 1 then total assets equal total liabilities.  Meaning that 100% of a business’ assets are financed with debt.  And 0% with equity.  Lenders do not like seeing this.  And will be very reluctant to loan money to you if your business operations cannot generate enough profits to build up some equity.  And that was the problem GM had.  Their business operations could not generate any profits.  So GM had to keep borrowing.

GM Toyota Debt Ratio

GM went from bad to worse after 2005.  Their debt ratio went from 1.02 in 2006.  To 1.24 in 2007.  And to 1.94 in 2008.  Indicating massive borrowings to offset massive operating losses.   And how big were those losses?  They lost $17.806 billion in 2005.  $5.823 billion in 2006.  $4.309 billion in 2007.  And in the year of their crash (2008) they lost $21.284 billion.  Meanwhile Toyota kept their debt ratio fluctuating between 0.61 and 0.62.  Very respectable.  And where lenders like to see it.  As they will be more willing to loan money to a company that can generate almost half of their financing needs from profitable business operations.  So why can’t GM?  Because of those legacy costs.  Which increases their cost of sales.

GM Toyota Cost of Sales

GM’s cost of sales was close to 100% of automotive sales revenue these 4 years.  Even exceeding 100% in 2008.  And it’s this cost of sales that sent GM into bankruptcy.  Toyota’s was close to 80% through these 4 years.  Leaving about 20% of sales to pay their other costs.  Like selling, general and administrative (S,G&A).  Whereas GM was already losing money before they started paying these expenses.  Thanks to generous UAW pay and benefit packages.  The job bank.  And the even greater costs of pensions and health care for their retirees.  It’s not CEO compensation that bankrupted GM.  It was the UAW.  As CEO compensation comes out of S,G&A.  Which was less than 10% of sales in 2007 and 2008.  Which was even less than Toyota’s.

GM Toyota S G and A

GM’s costs kept rising.  But they couldn’t pass it on to the consumer.  For if they did the people would just buy a less expensive Toyota.  So GM kept building cars even though they couldn’t sell them competitively.  And sold them at steep discounts.  Just to make room for more new cars.  So the UAW could keep building cars.  Incurring massive losses.  Hoping they could make it up in volume.  But that volume never came.

GM Toyota Automotive Sales as percent of 2005

Toyota continued to increase sales revenue year after year.  But GM’s sales grew at a flatter rate.  Even falling in 2008.  It was just too much.  GM was such a train wreck that it would have required a massive reorganization in a bankruptcy.  Specifically dealing with the uncompetitive UAW labor.  Especially those pensions and health care benefits for retirees.  Which the government bailout did not address.  At all.  The white collar workforce lost their pensions.  But not the UAW.  In fact, the government bailout went to bolster those pension and health care plans.  So the underlying problems are still there.  And another bankruptcy is likely around the corner.



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Trend Analysis—Long-Term Debt-Paying Ability

Posted by PITHOCRATES - January 28th, 2013

Economics 101

To Help with the Decision Making Process Small Business Owners look at Past Results and Trends

A small business owner has a lot on his or her mind.  Most of which have something to do with cash.  If they will have enough for their short-term needs.  And their long-term needs.  Because if they don’t there’s a good chance he or she will be a small business owner no more.  So with every decision a small business owner makes he or she asks this question.  What will be the cash-impact of this decision?  Both short-term.  And long-term.

To help with this decision making process small business owners look at past results.  And the trend between accounting periods.  Either quarterly.  Or monthly.  For there is a lot more to a business’ health than net profit.  Or cash in the bank.  You can have neither and still be a healthy business.  And you can have both and be in a lot of danger.  Because these are only parts of the bigger picture.  It’s how they fit together with the other pieces that give small business owners useful information.  So let’s take a look at 4 quarters of fictitious data.  And what the data trends tell us.

Trend Analysis Long-Term Debt

Looking at these numbers you can arrive at different conclusions.  Sales were 1.7 million or higher for all 4 quarters.  That seems good.  But sales fell the last two quarters.  That seems bad.  But it’s hard to get a full grasp of what these numbers can tell us on their own.  But if we look at some ratios we can glean a lot more information.  And can graph these ratios and look at trends.

If the Debt Ratio is less than 1 it means the Business is Insolvent

If you divide current assets (Cash through Inventory) by current liabilities (Accounts Payable through Current Portion of L/T Debt) you get the current ratio.  A liquidity ratio.  Telling a small business owner his or her short-term (in the next 12 months) cash health.  If this ratio is greater than one than you have more current assets than current liabilities.  Meaning you should be able to meet your cash needs in the next 12 months.  Which is good.  If it’s less than 1 it means you may not be able to meet your cash needs in the next 12 months.  Which is bad.  But is there a ‘correct’ number for a small business?  No.  It could vary greatly depending on the nature of your business.  But the trend of the current ratio can provide valuable information.

Trend Analysis Long-Term Debt Current Ratio

This business became more liquid from Q1 to Q2.  Meaning they should have been able to meet their short-term cash needs even easier in Q2 than Q1.  A good thing.  But they became less liquid from Q2 to Q3.  With their current ratio falling below 1.  Meaning they may not have had enough cash to meet their short-term cash needs.  Their short-term cash position improved in Q4.  But it was still below one.  So the current ratio trend for these 4 quarters shows a cause for concern.  Is it a problem?  It depends on the big picture.  So let’s look at more parts that make up the big picture.

Plotted on the same graph is a long-term debt-paying ability ratio.  The debt ratio.  Which we get by dividing Total Assets by Total Liabilities.  If this number is less than 1 it means Total Assets are greater than Total Liabilities.  Which is good.  If it’s greater than 1 it means the business is insolvent.  Which is bad.  As insolvency leads to bankruptcy.  The trend from Q1 to Q2 was good.  Their debt ratio fell.  But it rose between Q2 and Q3.  Rising above 1.  Which is a great cause for concern.  It fell between Q3 and Q4 but it was still below one.  Is this a problem?  It’s starting to look like it is.

There is no such thing as a Sure Thing for a Small Business Owner

Are they going to have trouble servicing their debt?  There are ratios for this, too.  Such as the Times Interest Earned (TIE).  Which shows how many times your recurring earnings can pay your interest costs.  In this example we have normal interest expense such as that paid on the business line of credit.  And the capitalized interest such as the interest portion on a car payment.  We calculate TIE by dividing recurring earnings by total interest expenses.

Trend Analysis Long-Term Debt Times Interest Earned

In Q1 their recurring earnings had no trouble covering their interest expenses.  In Q2 recurring earnings grew as did their ability to pay their interest expenses.  But the trend following Q2 has been downward.  Either indicating a surge in debt.  And interest due on that debt.  Or a fall in recurring earnings.  In this case it was a fall in earnings.  Which plummeted following Q2.  Looking at another ratio we can see the extent of these poor earnings on their long-term debt-paying ability.  If we divide Total Liabilities by Owner’s Equity we get the debt to equity ratio.  If this number is 1 then the business is financed equally by debt and equity.  If it’s less than 1 more equity (typically produced by recurring earnings) than debt financed the business.  Which is preferable as equity financing doesn’t incur any costs or risk.  If it’s greater than 1 it means more debt than equity financed the business.  Which is not as preferable.  Because debt-financing incurs costs.  As in interest expense.  And risk.  The greater the debt the greater the interest.  And the greater risk that they may not be able to repay their debt.  Which could lead to bankruptcy.

Trend Analysis Long-Term Debt Debt to Equity Ratio

This business was highly leveraged in Q1.  With virtually all financing coming from debt.  Probably because the owner drew a lot of money out during some profitable years.  Something banks don’t like seeing.  They like to see the owner sharing the risk with the bank.  If they don’t it can be a problem if the business owner wants to borrow money.  Which this one did in Q3.  Because business was doing so well this owner wanted to expand the business by adding another piece of production equipment.  But being so highly leveraged the owner had to put up a sizeable down-payment to get a loan for this new piece of production equipment.  As can be seen by the $20,000 owner contribution in Q3.  There was also a large decline in Owner’s Equity in Q3.  Indicating a one-time charge or correction.  With the loan the owner increased production.  And was looking forward to making a lot of money.  Which was not to happen.  For the economy fell into recession in Q3.

Sales fell just as they increased production.  Which led to a swelling inventory of unsold goods.  Worse, the recession was hurting everyone.  As can be seen by the growth in accounts receivable.  Because people were paying them slower they were paying their suppliers slower.  As is evident by the growth in their accounts payable.  Then a piece of equipment broke down.  They had no choice but to replace it.  Requiring another equity infusion of $10,000.  While some write-downs of bad debt reduced Owner’s Equity further.  (Or something similar.  With such low recurring profits by the time you add in other one-time and non-recurring costs this can lead to a net loss.  And a decline in Owner’s Equity.)  Despite this $30,000 equity infusion into the business the debt to equity ratio soared between Q3 and Q4.  Showing how poorly recurring operations were able to generate cash after that expansion in Q3.  Which explains their insolvency.  And as leveraged as they are it is very unlikely that they are going to be able to borrow money to help with their pressing cash needs.  Meaning that the decision to expand in Q3 may very well lead to bankruptcy.

This is just an example of the myriad concerns a small business owner has to consider before making a decision.  And a successful small business owner always has to factor in the possibility of a recession.  It’s not for the faint of heart.  Being a small business owner.  For it’s a lot like gambling.  There is just no such thing as a sure thing.



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