On the Flightdeck during Aviation Disasters

Posted by PITHOCRATES - March 19th, 2014

Technology 101

USAir Flight 427 on Approach to Pittsburgh flew through Wake Vortex and Lost Control

Malaysian Airlines Flight 370 search is still ongoing.  We’re seemingly no closer to understanding what happened than before.  There has been a lot of speculation.  And rebuttals to that speculation.  With many people saying things like why didn’t the crew radio?  Why didn’t they report a problem?  While others are saying that it is proof for their speculative theory.  That they were either under duress, had no time or were in on it and, therefore, went silent.  So what is it like on the flightdeck when something happens to an aircraft?  Well, because of past CVR (cockpit voice recorder) transcripts from previous accidents, we can get an idea.

On September 8, 1994, USAir Flight 427 flew into the wake vortex (little tornados trailing from a large plane’s wingtip) of a Delta Airlines Boeing 727 ahead of it.  This sideways tornado disrupted the airflow over the control surfaces of the USAir 737.  Disrupting it from level flight, causing it to roll left.  The autopilot tried to correct the roll as the 737 passed through the wake vortex core.  Causing more disruption of the airflow over the control surfaces.  The first officer then tried to stabilize the plane.  Control of the aircraft continued to deteriorate.  We pick up the CVR transcript just before this event (see 8 September 1994 – USAir 427).  CAUTION: The following recounts the final moments of Flight 427 and some may find it disturbing.

CAM-1 = Captain
CAM-2 = First Officer
CAM-3 = Cockpit Area Mike (cabin sounds and flight attendants)
RDO-1 = Radio Communications (Captain)
APP: Pittsburgh Approach

APP: USAir 427, turn left heading one zero zero. Traffic will be one to two o’clock, six miles, northbound Jetstream climbing out of thirty-three for five thousand.
RDO-1: We’re looking for the traffic, turning to one zero zero, USAir 427.
CAM-3: [Sound in engines increasing rpms]
CAM-2: Oh, yeah. I see the Jetstream.
CAM-1: Sheez…
CAM-2: zuh?
CAM-3: [Sound of thump; sound like ‘clickety-click’; again the thumping sound, but quieter than before]
CAM-1: Whoa … hang on.
CAM-3: [Sound of increasing rpms in engines; sound of clickety-click; sound of trim wheel turning at autopilot trim speed; sound similar to pilot grunting; sound of wailing horn similar to autopilot disconnect warning]
CAM-1: Hang on.
CAM-2: Oh, Shit.
CAM-1: Hang on. What the hell is this?
CAM-3: [Sound of stick shaker; sound of altitude alert]
CAM-3: Traffic. Traffic.
CAM-1: What the…
CAM-2: Oh…
CAM-1: Oh God, Oh God…
RDO-1: 427, emergency!
CAM-2: [Sound of scream]
CAM-1: Pull…
CAM-2: Oh…
CAM-1: Pull… pull…
CAM-2: God…
CAM-1: [Sound of screaming]

At 19:03:01 in the flight there was a full left rudder deflection.  The plane yawed (twisted like a weathervane) to the left.  A second later it rolled 30 degrees left.  This caused the aircraft to pitch down.  Where it continued to roll.  The plane rolled upside down and pitched further nose-down.  The pilots never recovered.  The plane flew nearly straight into the ground at 261kts.  The crash investigated focused on the rudder.  Boeing redesigned it.  Pilots since have received more training on rudder inputs.  And flight data recorders now record additional rudder data.  This incident shows how fast a plane can go from normal flight to a crash.  The captain had time to radio one warning.  But within seconds from the beginning of the event the plane crashed.  Illustrating how little time pilots have to identify problems and correct them.

An In-Flight Deployment of a Thrust Reverser breaks up Lauda Air Flight 004

A plane wants to fly.  It is inherently stable.  As long as enough air flows over its wings.  Jet engines provide thrust that push an airplane’s wings through the air.  The curved surfaces of the wings interacting with the air passing over it creates lift.  As long as a plane’s jet engines push the wing through the air a plane will fly.  On May 26, 1991, something happened to Lauda Air Flight 004 to disrupt the smooth flow of air over the Boeing 767’s wings.  Something that isn’t supposed to happen during flight.  But only when a plane lands.  Reverse thrust.  As a plane lands the pilot reverses the thrust on the jet engines to slow the airplane.  Unfortunately for Flight 004, one of its jet engines deployed its thrust reverser while the plane was at about 31,000 feet.  We pick up the CVR transcript just as they receive a warning indication that the reverse thruster could deploy (see 26 May 1991 – Lauda 004).  CAUTION: The following recounts the final moments of Flight 004 and some may find it disturbing.

23.21:21 – [Warning light indicated]

23.21:21 FO: Shit.

23.21:24 CA: That keeps, that’s come on.

23.22:28 FO: So we passed transition altitude one-zero-one-three

23.22:30 CA: OK.

23.23:57 CA: What’s it say in there about that, just ah…

23.24:00 FO: (reading from quick reference handbook) Additional system failures may cause in-flight deployment. Expect normal reverse operation after landing.

23.24:11 CA: OK.

23.24:12 CA: Just, ah, let’s see.

23.24:36 CA: OK.

23.25:19 FO: Shall I ask the ground staff?

23.25:22 CA: What’s that?

23.25:23 FO: Shall I ask the technical men?

23.25:26 CA: Ah, you can tell ’em it, just it’s, it’s, it’s, just ah, no, ah, it’s probably ah wa… ah moisture or something ’cause it’s not just, oh, it’s coming on and off.

23.25:39 FO: Yeah.

23.25:40 CA: But, ah, you know it’s a … it doesn’t really, it’s just an advisory thing, I don’t ah …

23.25:55 CA: Could be some moisture in there or somethin’.

23.26:03 FO: Think you need a little bit of rudder trim to the left.

23.26:06 CA: What’s that?

23.26:08 FO: You need a little bit of rudder trim to the left.

23.26:10 CA: OK.

23.26:12 CA: OK.

23.26:50 FO: (starts adding up figures in German)

23.30:09 FO: (stops adding figures)

23.30:37 FO: Ah, reverser’s deployed.

23.30:39 – [sound of snap]

23.30:41 CA: Jesus Christ!

23.30:44 – [sound of four caution tones]

23.30:47 – [sound of siren warning starts]

23.30:48 – [sound of siren warning stops]

23.30:52 – [sound of siren warning starts and continues until the recording ends]

23.30:53 CA: Here, wait a minute!

23.30:58 CA: Damn it!

23.31:05 – [sound of bang]

[End of Recording]

The 767 Emergency/Malfunction Checklist stated that upon receiving the warning indicator ADDITIONAL system faults MAY cause an in-flight deployment of the thrust reverser.  But that one warning indication was NOT expected to cause any problem with the thrust reversers in stopping the plane after landing.  At that point it was not an emergency.  So they radioed no emergency.  About 10 minutes later the thrust reverser on the left engine deployed in flight.  When it did the left engine pulled the left wing back as the right engine pushed the right wing forward.  Disrupting the airflow over the left wing.  Causing it to stall.  And the twisting force around the yaw axis created such great stresses on the airframe that the aircraft broke up in the air.  The event happened so fast from thrust reverser deployment to the crash (less than 30 seconds) the crew had no time to radio an emergency before crashing.

Fire in the Cargo Hold brought down ValuJet Flight 592

One of the most dangerous things in aviation is fire.  Fire can fill the plane with smoke.  It can incapacitate the crew.  It can burn through electric wiring.  It can burn through control cables.  And it can burn through structural components.  A plane flying at altitude must land immediately on the detection of fire/smoke.  Because they can’t pull over and get out of the plane.  They have to get the plane on the ground.  And the longer it takes to do that the more damage the fire can do.  On May 11, 1996, ValuJet Flight 592 took off from Miami International Airport.  Shortly into the flight they detected smoke inside the McDonnell Douglas DC-9.  We pick up the CVR transcript just before they detected fire aboard (see 11 May 1996 – ValuJet 591).  CAUTION: The following recounts the final moments of Flight 592 and some may find it disturbing.

CAM — Cockpit area microphone voice or sound source
RDO — Radio transmissions from Critter 592
ALL — Sound source heard on all channels
INT — Transmissions over aircraft interphone system
Tower — Radio transmission from Miami tower or approach
UNK — Radio transmission received from unidentified source
PA — Transmission made over aircraft public address system
-1 — Voice identified as Pilot-in-Command (PIC)
-2 — Voice identified as Co-Pilot
-3 — Voice identified as senior female flight attendant
-? — Voice unidentified
* — Unintelligible word
@ — Non pertinent word
# — Expletive
% — Break in continuity
( ) — Questionable insertion
[ ] — Editorial insertion
… — Pause

14:09:36 PA-2 flight attendants, departure check please.

14:09:44 CAM-1 we’re *** turbulence

14:09:02 CAM [sound of click]

14:10:03 CAM [sound of chirp heard on cockpit area microphone channel with simultaneous beep on public address/interphone channel]

14:10:07 CAM-1 what was that?

14:10:08 CAM-2 I don’t know.

14:10:12 CAM-1 *** (’bout to lose a bus?)

14:10:15 CAM-1 we got some electrical problem.

14:10:17 CAM-2 yeah.

14:10:18 CAM-2 that battery charger’s kickin’ in. ooh, we gotta.

14:10:20 CAM-1 we’re losing everything.

14:10:21 Tower Critter five-nine-two, contact Miami center on one-thirty-two-forty-five, so long.

14:10:22 CAM-1 we need, we need to go back to Miami.

14:10:23 CAM [sounds of shouting from passenger cabin]

14:10:25 CAM-? fire, fire, fire, fire [from female voices in cabin]

14:10:27 CAM-? we’re on fire, we’re on fire. [from male voice]

14:10:28 CAM [sound of tone similar to landing gear warning horn for three seconds]

14:10:29 Tower Critter five-ninety-two contact Miami center, one-thirty-two-forty-five.

14:10:30 CAM-1 ** to Miami.

14:10:32 RDO-2 Uh, five-ninety-two needs immediate return to Miami.

14:10:35 Tower Critter five-ninety-two, uh, roger, turn left heading two-seven-zero.  Descend and maintain seven-thousand.

14:10:36 CAM [sounds of shouting from passenger cabin subsides]

14:10:39 RDO-2 Two-seven-zero, seven-thousand, five-ninety-two.

14:10:41 Tower What kind of problem are you havin’?

14:10:42 CAM [sound of horn]

14:10:44 CAM-1 fire

14:10:46 RDO-2 Uh, smoke in the cockp … smoke in the cabin.

14:10:47 Tower Roger.

14:10:49 CAM-1 what altitude?

14:10:49 CAM-2 seven thousand.

14:10:52 CAM [sound similar to cockpit door moving]

14:10:57 CAM [sound of six chimes similar to cabin service interphone]

14:10:58 CAM-3 OK, we need oxygen, we can’t get oxygen back here.

14:11:00 INT [sound similar to microphone being keyed only on Interphone channel]

14:11:02 CAM-3 *ba*, is there a way we could test them? [sound of clearing her voice]

14:11:07 Tower Critter five-ninety-two, when able to turn left heading two-five-zero.  Descend and maintain five-thousand.

14:11:08 CAM [sound of chimes similar to cabin service interphone]

14:11:10 CAM [sounds of shouting from passenger cabin]

14:11:11 RDO-2 Two-five-zero seven-thousand.

14:11:12 CAM-3 completely on fire.

14:11:14 CAM [sounds of shouting from passenger cabin subsides]

14:11:19 CAM-2 outta nine.

14:11:19 CAM [sound of intermittant horn]

14:11:21 CAM [sound similar to loud rushing air]

14:11:38 CAM-2 Critter five-ninety-two, we need the, uh, closest airport available …

14:11:42 Tower Critter five-ninety-two, they’re going to be standing by for you. You can plan runway one two to dolpin now.

14:11:45 one minute and twelve second interruption in CVR recording]

14:11:46 RDO-? Need radar vectors.

14:11:49 Tower critter five ninety two turn left heading one four zero 14:11:52

RDO-? one four zero

14:12:57 CAM [sound of tone similar to power interruption to CVR]

14:12:57 CAM [sound similar to loud rushing air]

14:12:57 ALL [sound of repeating tones similar to CVR self test signal start and continue]

14:12:58 Tower critter five ninety two contact miami approach on corrections no you you just keep my frequency

14:13:11 CAM [interruption of unknown duration in CVR recording]

14:13:15 CAM [sounds of repeating tones similar to recorder self-test signal starts and continues, rushing air.]

14:13:18 Tower critter five ninety two you can uh turn left heading one zero zero and join the runway one two localizer at miami

14:13:25: End of CVR recording.

14:13:27 Tower critter five ninety two descend and maintain three thousand

14:13:43 Tower critter five ninety two opa locka airports aout ah twelve o’clock at fifteen miles

[End of Recording]

The cargo hold of this DC-9 was airtight.  This was its fire protection.  Because any fire would quickly consume any oxygen in the hold and burn itself out.  But also loaded in Flight 592’s hold were some oxygen generators.  The things that produce oxygen for passengers to breathe through masks that fall down during a loss of pressurization.  These produce oxygen through a chemical reaction that produces an enormous amount of heat.  These were hazardous equipment that were forbidden to be transported on the DC-9.  Some confusion in labeling led some to believe they were ’empty’ canisters when they were actually ‘expired’.  The crash investigation concluded that one of these were jostled on the ground and activated.  It produced an oxygen rich environment in the cargo hold.  And enough heat to start a smoldering fire.  Which soon turned into a raging inferno that burned through the cabin floor.  And through the flightdeck floor.  Either burning through all flight controls.  Or incapacitating the crew.  Sending the plane into a nose dive into the everglades in less than 4 minutes from the first sign of trouble.



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Malaysian Airlines Flight 370

Posted by PITHOCRATES - March 16th, 2014

Week in Review

There are a lot of airplanes in the air at any given time.  And, remarkably, over 99% of those planes reach their destinations safely.  So when one doesn’t it’s big news.  Such as Malaysian Airlines Flight 370.  A plane that has been missing since March 8, 2014.  Ten days as of this writing.  And still no one knows what happened.  There’s been a lot of speculation.  From pilot suicide to fire to electrical failure to catastrophic mechanical failure to a high jacking to piracy.  Some have even suggested that it may have been a trial run by terrorists to test a new terror plot.  To see the problems they may encounter.  And to see what the response would be.  If it wasn’t it might as well had been.  As all the speculators have given a wealth of information that terrorists might have gained had it been a trial run.

So what do we know?  Concretely?  The plane and the people aboard are missing.  Which is the only absolute we know.  Now what plausible assumptions can we make?  The plane crashed and we haven’t found it yet.  Or the plane was stolen.  For some future use.  If it crashed it is imperative to find it should there be an unknown issue with the Boeing 777.  An incredibly safe airliner to date.  And very popular with the airlines for their long-haul routes.  So if there is an unknown issue we need to know because there are so many of these flying.

Perhaps the more disturbing assumption is that it was stolen.  Because it is an intercontinental jetliner.  North Korea has missiles that can reach the United States.  Saddam Hussein had scud missiles that could reach Israel.  Iran has a nuclear program.  But may not have long-range missile technology.  A 777 provides long-range capability.  And if it was stolen it would be hard to blame any state for what may happen if that plane was used for some nefarious purpose.  As there would be no flight plan filed tracing it back to a departing airport.  Which is even a greater incentive to find it.  As a lot of people are talking about this possibility one would assume that great attention is being placed on runways long enough for a refueled 777 to take off from.  Which would be longer than one needed to land a 777 low on fuel.  And one could also assume that airborne radar is being used to try and catch anyone trying to fly at night below radar coverage.  Giving ample warning to scramble fighter jets to intercept the threat.  And shooting it down if necessary.  So even if it turns out that the airplane was stolen it would be very difficult to use that airplane for nefarious purposes.  But not impossible.

There would be a lot less speculation had that transponder remained turned on.  For if we can ‘see’ the airplane we know where it is.  A rather simple device that tells air traffic control everything they need to know about an airplane.  Which is important considering how many airplanes are in the sky at any one time.  Just to get an idea of how many you can watch a visualization of all air traffic over European airspace (see Watch an Entire Day of Air Traffic in One Astonishing Visualization by Kyle VanHemert posted 3/14/2014 on Wired).  So perhaps ‘hardening’ the transponder is the first thing we should be doing.  Something that can probably be done for little cost.  Say adding a rechargeable battery to the transponder that is only accessible from outside the aircraft.  So it is inaccessible during flight.  If the transponder is switched off and it transfers to battery it could broadcast the high jacking code.  While providing the plane’s location.  If the plane has a catastrophic breakup in flight the transponder could be in a hardened shell that keeps broadcasting during and after this event on battery power.  It may add some weight.  And some cost.  But if it can provide an aircraft’s location after an event it may prevent some of the uncertainty in future events like there is with Malaysian Airlines Flight 370.



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Aviation Incidents and Accidents

Posted by PITHOCRATES - March 12th, 2014

Technology 101

The Pilots of Aloha Airlines Flight 243 landed Safely after Fatigue Cracks caused Part of the Cabin to Disintegrate

The de Havilland Company introduced the jet airliner to the world.  The Comet.  A 4-engine jet airliner with a pressurized cabin that could carry 36 passengers.  It could fly at 40,000 feet at speeds close to 500 mph.  Just blowing the piston-engine competition away.  Until, that is, they started breaking up in flight.  A consequence of pressuring the cabin.  The inflating and deflating of the metal cabin fatiguing the metal of the cabin.  Until fatigue cracks appeared at stress points.  Cracks that extended from the cycles of pressurizing and depressurizing the cabin.  Until the cracks extended so much that the pressure inside the cabin blew through the cracks, disintegrating the plane in flight.

Japan is a nation of islands.  Connecting these islands together are airplanes.  They use jumbo jets like buses and commuter trains.  Packing them with 500+ passengers for short hops between the islands.  Putting far more pressurization cycles on these planes than typical long-haul 747 routes.  On August 12, 1985, Japan Airlines Flight 123 left Haneda Airport, Tokyo, for a routine flight to Osaka.  Shortly after takeoff as the cabin pressurized the rear pressure bulkhead failed (due to an improper repair splice of the pressure plate using a single row of rivets instead of a double row following a tail strike that damaged it).  The rapid force of the depressurization blew out through the tail section of the aircraft.  Causing great damage of the control surfaces.  And severing the lines in all four hydraulic systems.  Leaving the plane uncontrollable.  The crew switched their transponder to the emergency code 7700 and called in to declare an emergency.  But they could do little to save the plane.  The plane flew erratically and lost altitude until it crashed into a mountain.  Killing all but 4 of the 524 aboard.

Hawaii is similar to Japan.  They both have islands they interconnect with airplanes.  Putting a lot of pressurization cycles on these planes.  On April 28, 1988, Aloha Airlines Flight 243 left Hilo Airport bound for Honolulu.  Just as the Boeing 737 leveled off at 24,000 feet there was a loud explosive sound and a loud surge of air.  The pilots were thrown back in their seats in a violent and rapid decompression.  The flightdeck door was sucked away.  Looking behind them they could see the cabin ceiling in first class was no longer there (due to fatigue cracks radiating out from rivets that caused pressurized air to blow out, taking the ceiling and walls of the first class cabin with it).  They could see only blue sky.  They put on their oxygen masks and began an emergency descent.  The first officer switched the transponder to emergency code 7700.  The roar of air was so loud the pilots could barely hear each other as they shouted to each other or used the radio.  The flight controls were operable but not normal.  They even lost one of their two engines.  But the flight crew landed safely.  With the loss of only one life.  A flight attendant that was sucked out of the aircraft during the explosive decompression.

The Fact that 185 People survived the United Airlines 232 Crash is a Testament to the Extraordinary Skill of those Pilots

On June 12, 1972, American Airlines Flight 96 left Detroit Metropolitan Airport for Buffalo after arriving from Los Angeles.  The McDonnell Douglas DC-10 took on new living passengers in Detroit.  As well as one deceased passenger in a coffin.  Which was loaded in the rear cargo hold.  As the DC-10 approached 12,000 feet there was a loud explosive sound.  Then the flightdeck door was sucked away and the pilots were thrown back in their seats in an explosive decompression.  The aft cargo door (improperly latched—its design was later revised to prevent improperly latching in the future) had blown out as the cargo hold pressurized.  As it did the rapid decompression collapsed the floor above.  Into the control cabling.  The rudder was slammed fully left.  All three throttle levels slammed closed.  The elevator control was greatly inhibited.  The plane lost a lot of its flight controls but the pilots were able to bring the plane back to Detroit.  Using asymmetric thrust of the two wing-mounted engines and ailerons to compensate for the deflected rudder.  And both pilots pulling back hard on the yoke to move the elevator.  Due to the damage the approach was fast and low.  When they landed they applied reverse thrust to slow down the fast aircraft.  At that speed, though, the deflected rudder pulled them off the runway towards the terminal buildings.  By reapplying asymmetric thrust the pilot was able to straighten the aircraft out on the grass.  As the speed declined the rudder force decreased and the pilot was able to steer the plane back on the runway.  There was no loss of life.

On July 19, 1989, United Airlines Flight 232 took off from Stapleton International Airport in Denver for Chicago.  About an hour into the flight there was a loud bang from the rear of the plane.  The aircraft shuddered.  The instruments showed that the tail-mounted engine had failed.  As the crew responded to that the second officer saw something more alarming.  Hydraulic pressure and fluid quantity in the three hydraulic systems were falling (a fan disc in the tail-mounted engine disintegrating and exploded like shrapnel from an undetected manufacturing flaw, taking out the 3 hydraulic systems).  The flight crew soon discovered that they had lost all control of the airplane.  The plane was making a slight turn when the engine failed.  And the flight control surfaces were locked in that position.  The captain reduced power on the left engine to stop the plane from turning.  The two remaining engines became the only means of control they had.  Another DC-10 pilot traveling as a passenger came forward and offered his assistance.  He knelt on the floor behind the throttle levels and adjusted them continuously to regain control of the plane.  He tried to dampen the rising and falling of the plane (moving like a ship rolling on the ocean).  As well as turn the aircraft onto a course that would take them to an emergency landing at Sioux City.  They almost made it.  Unfortunately that rolling motion tipped the left wing down just before touchdown.  It struck the ground.  And caused the plane to roll and crash.  Killing 111 of the 296 aboard.  It was a remarkable feat of flying, though.  Which couldn’t be duplicated in the simulator given the same system failures.  As flight control by engine thrust alone cannot provide reliable flight control.  The fact that 185 people survived this crash is a testament to the extraordinary skill of those pilots.

On July 17, 1996, TWA Flight 800 took off from JFK Airport bound for Rome.  About 12 minutes into the flight the crew acknowledged air traffic control (ATC) instructions to climb to 15,000 feet.  It was the last anyone heard from TWA 800.  About 38 seconds later another airplane in the sky reported seeing an explosion and a fire ball falling into the water.  About where TWA 800 was.  ATC then tried to contact TWA 800.  “TWA800, Center…TWA eight zero zero, if you can hear Center, ident…TWA800, Center…TWA800, if you can hear Center, ident…TWA800, Center.”  There was no response.  The plane was there one minute and gone the next.  There was no distress call.  Nothing.  The crash investigation determined that an air-fuel mixture in the center fuel tank was heated by air conditioner units mounted below the tank, creating a high-pressure, explosive vapor in the tank that was ignited by an electrical spark.  The explosion broke the plane apart in flight killing all 230 aboard.

The Greatest Danger in Flying Today may be Pilots Trusting their Computers more than their Piloting Skills

On December 29, 1972, Eastern Airlines Flight 401 left JFK bound for Miami.  Flight 401 was a brand new Lockheed L-1011 TriStar.  One of the new wide-body jets to enter service along with the Boeing 747 and the McDonnell Douglas DC-10.  Not only was it big but it had the latest in automatic flight control systems.  As Flight 401 turned on final approach they lowered their landing gear.  When the three landing gear are down and locked for landing there are three green indicating lights displayed on the flightdeck on the first officer’s side.  On this night there were only 2 green lights.  Indicating that the nose wheel was not down.  So they contacted ATC with their problem and proceeded to circle the airport until they resolved the problem.  ATC told them to climb to 2000 feet.  The 1st officer flew the aircraft on the course around the airport.  The captain then tried to reach the indicating light to see if it was a burnt out lamp.  Then the flight engineer got involved.  As did the first officer after turning on the automatic altitude hold control.  Then another person on the flightdeck joined in.  That indicating lamp got everyone’s full attention.  Unable to determine if the lamp was burnt out the pilot instructed the flight engineer to climb down into the avionics bay below the flightdeck to visually confirm the nose gear was down and locked.  He reported that he couldn’t see it.  So the other guy on the flightdeck joined him.  During all of this someone bumped the yoke with enough pressure to release the automatic altitude hold but no one noticed.  The airplane began a gradual descent.  When they approached the ground a ground proximity warming went off and they checked their altitude.  Their altimeters didn’t agree with the autopilot setting.  Just as they were asking each other what was going on the aircraft crashed into the everglades.  Killing 101 of the 176 on board.

On June 1, 2009, Air France Flight 447 was en route from Rio de Janeiro to Paris.  This was a fly-by-wire Airbus A330 aircraft.  With side stick controllers (i.e., joysticks) instead of the traditional wheel and yoke controls.  The A330 had sophisticated automatic flight controls.  They practically flew the plane by themselves.  With pilots spending more of their time monitoring and inputting inputs to these systems than flying.  Flight 447 flew into some turbulence.  The autopilot disengaged.  The aircraft began to roll from the turbulence.  The pilot tried to null these out but over compensated.  At the same time he pitched the nose up abruptly, slowing the airplane and causing a stall warning as the excessive angle of attack slowed the plane from 274 knots to 52 knots.  The pilot got the rolling under control but due to the excessive angle of attack the plane was gaining a lot of altitude.  The pitot tube (a speed sensing device) began to ice up, reducing the size of the opening the air entered.  Changing the airflow into the tube.  Resulting in a speed indication that they were flying faster than they actually were.  The engines were running at 100% power but the nose was pitched up so much that the plane was losing speed and altitude.  There was no accurate air speed indication.  For pilot or autopilot.  The crew failed to follow appropriate procedures for problems with airspeed indication.  And did not understand how to recognize the approach of a stall.  Despite the high speed indicated the plane was actually stalling.   Which it did.  And fell from 38,000 feet in 3 and a half minutes.  Crashing into the ocean.  Killing all 228 on board.

It takes a lot to bring an airplane down from the sky.  And when it happens it is usually the last in a chain of events.  Where each individual event in the chain could not have brought the plane down.  But when taken together they can.  Most times pilots have a chance to save the aircraft.  Especially the stick and rudder pilots.  Who gained a lot of flying experience before the advanced autopilot systems of today.  And can feel what the airplane is doing through the touch of their hand on the yoke and through the seat of their pants.  They are tuned in to the engine noise and the environment around them.  Processing continuous sensations and sounds as well as studying their instruments and the airspace in front of them.  Because they flew the airplane.  Not the computers.  Allowing them to take immediate action instead of trying to figure out what was happening with the computers.  Losing precious time when additional seconds could trigger that last event in a chain of events that ends in the loss of the aircraft.  That’s why some of the best pilots come from this stick and rudder generation.  Such as Aloha Airlines Flight 243, American Airlines Flight 96 and United Airlines Flight 232.  Sometimes the event is so sudden or so catastrophic that there is nothing a pilot can do to save the aircraft.  Such as Japan Airlines Flight 123 and TWA Flight 800.  And sometimes pilots rely so much on automated systems that they let themselves get distracted from the business of flying.  Even the best stick and rudder pilots adjusting to new technology.  Such as Eastern Airlines Flight 401.  Or pilots brought up on the new technology.  Such as Air France Flight 447.  But these events are so rare that when a plane does fall out of the sky it is big news.  Because it rarely happens.  Planes have never been safer.  Which may now be the greatest danger in flying.  A false sense of security.  Which may allow a chain of events to end in a plane falling down from the sky.  As pilots rely more and more on computers to fly our airplanes they may step in too late to fix a problem.  Or not at all.  Trusting those computers more than their piloting skills.



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The Profit Incentive has made Air Travel Safe and Crashes Rare

Posted by PITHOCRATES - July 7th, 2013

Week in Review

During the height of the Cold War people feared the might of the Soviet Union.  And nuclear war.  As those were scary days.  For the Soviet Union had some awesome military power.  And was the only nation that could threaten the United States.  But you know what was even scarier?  Flying on a Soviet jetliner.

The Soviet Union lost the Cold War because communism is a terrible economic system.  The Soviets couldn’t feed their people.  Or keep enough toilet paper and soap on store shelves.  As their command economy did such a horrible job in allocating scarce resources that have alternative uses.  So you never had the best of anything in the Soviet Union.  Which is why people from the West dreaded flying into the Soviet Union on Soviet jetliners.  For they had a tendency to crash.  The Soviets stole as much technology from the West to improve their technology as they could.  And many of their aircraft designs looked similar to those in the West.  But they were Soviet made.  And Soviet maintained.  In the same economic system that couldn’t keep toilet paper or soap on store shelves.

The problem with the Soviet Union was that there was no profit incentive.  When money is at stake everything is better.  Like in the West.  But when you don’t have profits you don’t have to please customers.  And you don’t.  Everything is like standing in line waiting to renew your driver’s license.  And if a plane crashes it doesn’t change anything.  Planes will keep flying as they were before.  And everyone’s pay will be the same as before.  So everyone will do the minimum.  Just enough to avoid punishment.  This is why Soviet air travel was among the most dangerous air travel in the world.

This past Saturday there was an Asiana Air 777 that crashed while landing at San Francisco International Airport.  Of the approximate 300 on board 2 people died.  Some were injured.  While many were able to walk away from the crash.  Cable television has been covering this nearly 24/7 since the crash.  Even though only two people died (a terrible tragedy but a tragedy that could have been far worse).  And one of them may have been accidentally driven over by the first responders arriving on scene.  Why the intense media coverage?  Because accidents like this are so rare these days.  Especially when they involve big airplanes.  And the 777 is about as big as they come.

In the aftermath of this crash we can see why flying has become so safe under a profit incentive.  Unlike in the former Soviet Union (see Asiana Air Crash May Bring New Safety Regulations in Korea by Kyunghee Park posted 7/7/2013 on Bloomberg).

“Asiana’s accident is going to damage the image of not just Asiana, but all Korean airlines,” said Um Kyung A, an analyst at Shinyoung Securities Co. in Seoul. “It only takes one incident to undermine years of work Korean airlines have made to get a solid, accident-free record. This will prompt the government to call for stricter safety measures…”

Shares of Asiana, South Korea’s second-largest airline, slumped to the lowest level in more than three years in Seoul trading today. The stock plunged as much as 9.6 percent to 4,630 won, the lowest price since April 2010…

All South Korean airlines, including budget carriers, were ordered to ensure safety, the transport ministry said in an e-mailed statement yesterday. The country had no fatal air crashes between December 1999 and July 2011, when an Asiana freighter crashed, the ministry said…

A Korean Air 747-200 cargo plane crashed in December 1999 shortly after taking off from London’s Stansted Airport, killing three of its four crew members on board. That was eight months after the airline’s MD-11 freighter crashed in Shanghai in April and killed eight people, including those on the ground.

The accidents prompted the government to tighten safety standards at Korean airlines, as well as foreign ones flying into the country. It also strengthened regulations on pilot and maintenance licenses.

Pilots were required to be trained and evaluated at an international center, and airlines were required to fly more hours on domestic routes before obtaining a license to fly overseas. The government also strengthened safety regulations at domestic airports.

The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration downgraded South Korea to Category 2 safety rating in August 2001 following the accidents. The rating was restored to Category 1, which allowed Korean carriers to open new routes in the U.S. and resume marketing alliances with American carriers, in December that year.

In the Soviet Union there was no profit incentive as they put people before profits.  Which made Soviet air travel among the most dangerous in the world.  But look at what happens when there is a connection between safety and profits.  After a series of crashes and a downgrade by the U.S. to Category 2 South Korea tightened safety standards.  To improve their safety record.  For the fewer accidents you have the more profitable you will be.  A very strong incentive to be safe.  Which is why South Korea enjoys a better safety record than the Soviet Union ever had.

When people say that we need government to keep us safe from the greed of corporations all we need to do is look at the former Soviet Union.  And how their government failed to keep their flying public as safe as in countries that use a profit incentive.  For no corporation wants to see their stock price fall 9.6 percent.  Have a nation block them from opening new routes into their country.  Or have people perceive that their planes are not safe.  Things the former Soviet Union did not have to worry about.  As the Soviet people had no other alternative but to fly on those dangerous planes.  But there are many airlines flying between Asia and the United States.  And if one has a poor safety record people will book their flight with another airline.  This is what the profit system gives people.  Choice.  Where people can choose not to fly on an unsafe airline.  Something the Soviets couldn’t do.  Because there were no profits in the Soviet Union.



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